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Abstract:  
We develop a new general equilibrium model of trade with heterogeneous firms, variable 
demand elasticities and endogenously determined wages. Trade integration favors wage 
convergence, intensifies competition, and forces the least efficient firms to leave the 
market, thereby affecting aggregate productivity. Since wage and productivity responses 
are endogenous, our model is well suited to study the impacts of trade integration on 
aggregate productivity and factor prices. Using Canada-U.S. interregional trade data, we 
first estimate a system of theory-based gravity equations under the general equilibrium 
constraints generated by the model. Doing so allows us to measure “border effects” and 
to decompose them into a “pure” border effect, relative and absolute wage effects, and a 
selection effect. Using the estimated parameter values, we then quantify the impacts of 
removing the Canada-U.S. border on wages, productivity, markups, the share of 
exporters, the mass of varieties produced and consumed, and welfare. We finally 
provide a similar quantification with respect to regional population changes. 
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1 Introduction
Over the last decade, empirical research in international trade has revealed the existence of
substantial firm-level heterogeneity. Only a small share of firms is engaged in foreign trade,
and these firms differ along various dimensions from purely domestic ones. Exporters tend,
in particular, to be larger and more productive than non-exporters. These firm-level produc-
tivity differences act as channels through which trade liberalization brings about aggregate
productivity gains, by forcing the least efficient firms to leave the market and by reallocating
market shares from low to high productivity firms (e.g., Bernard and Jensen, 1999; Aw et al.,
2000; Pavcnik, 2002; Bernard et at., 2007). While these firm-level facts are intrinsically incom-
patible with the paradigm of the ‘representative firm’ that has dominated international trade
theory for decades, several models with heterogeneous firms have been recently put forward
to accomodate them. In his seminal contribution, Melitz (2003) extends Krugman’s (1980)
model of intra-industry trade to cope with productivity differences across firms and shows that
the most productive firms self-select into export markets and that trade liberalization forces
the least efficient firms to exit, thus leading to aggregate productivity gains.
Although Melitz’s (2003) model has greatly increased our understanding of intra-industry
reallocations in a trading world it is fair to say that it relies on two restrictive assumptions:
factor price equalization (FPE) and constant elasticity of substitution (CES). First, as is well
known, FPE need not hold in models of monopolistic competition with differentiated goods
and trade costs (e.g., Helpman and Krugman, 1985). Nevertheless, it does hold in Melitz’s
model because countries are assumed to be symmetric so that no wage differences can arise in
equilibrium. Though analytically convenient, such an assumption masks the fact that different
productivity gains across countries map quite naturally into different changes in factor prices
and incomes, both of which are bound to affect trade in various ways in general equilibrium.
Second, the CES framework generates constant markups over marginal costs, i.e., price-cost
margins are unaffected by trade integration, by firms’ productivities, and by local market size.
These features do not accord with abundant recent empirical evidence.1
The recent literature on heterogeneous firms has addressed either one of these restrictive
features. First, Bernard et al. (2003) relax FPE by imposing exogenous cross-country wage
differences within a Ricardian framework. However, their model offers the stark prediction
of identical distributions of markups across countries. Second, Melitz and Ottaviano (2008)
provide a model where markups decrease with trade integration and can be distributed differ-
ently across countries, depending on both market size and accessibility. However, they assume
1For example, Badinger (2007) finds solid evidence that the Single Market Programme of the European
Union has reduced markups in aggregate manufacturing. Foster et al. (2008) show that more productive firms
set lower prices and charge higher markups. Finally, Syverson (2004) documents that areas of high economic
density and large local market size have higher average productivity and less productivity dispersion.
2
quasi-linear preferences which channel all income effects towards a homogeneous numeraire
good. The quasi-linear specification also implies FPE given identical technologies across coun-
tries and free trade in the numeraire good. Last, Bernard et al. (2007) embed Melitz’s model
into a two-country Heckscher-Ohlin framework, which allows for factor price differences across
countries. They, however, rely again on the CES specification and therefore obtain constant
markups that are invariant to trade liberalization and market size.2
We are unaware of a full-fledged general equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms in
which wages and markups are endogenous and need not be equalized across countries. De-
veloping such a framework is the first contribution of this paper. To this end, we extend
the recent model by Behrens and Murata (2007) to accommodate heterogeneous firms and
multiple countries which may differ in size, accessibility, and their underlying productivity
distributions. Within this setting, we shed light on the impacts of trade integration and mar-
ket size on wages, firm selection, and markups. Falling trade barriers increase expected profits
in the foreign markets and encourage firms to start exporting. This induces tougher selection,
increases average productivity and reduces average markups as in, for instance, Melitz and
Ottaviano (2008). Furthermore, higher average productivity maps into wage changes which
differ across asymmetric countries. Put differently, trade integration spurs additional effects
due to changes in relative and absolute wages. On the one hand, wages in some regions will
rise relatively to those in others. Consequently, there is a cost increase for the firms located in
regions where relative wages rise, which erodes their competitive position in foreign markets.
On the other hand, absolute wages also rise in some regions which are then reflected in higher
export prices and larger local demands. These various price and income effects must be taken
into consideration to understand how trade liberalization may affect productivity and wages.
Despite the richness of effects and economic mechanisms at work, our model remains highly
tractable even when extended to multiple asymmetric countries. This makes it particularly well
suited as a basis for applied work. Therefore, turning to our second contribution, we take our
model to data and quantify it using a methodology similar to the ones developed in Anderson
and van Wincoop (2003) and Bernard et al. (2003). To do so, we derive a gravity equation
under the general equilibrium constraints generated by the model, and structurally estimate
it using a well-known dataset on interregional trade flows between U.S. states and Canadian
provinces.3 This quantified framework is particularly useful, because it allows us to finely assess
2Other important contributions to the heterogeneous firms literature with a different focus include Helpman
et al. (2004), who extend Melitz’s (2003) model to include multinational firms; and Antra`s and Helpman (2004),
who introduce outsourcing into a heterogeneous firms framework. For an overview of recent advances in the
literature, see Helpman (2006).
3Our empirical analysis supplements Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) in that our general equilibrium
constraints include both endogenous wages and firm heterogeneity. Several recent contributions have derived
gravity equations with heterogeneous firms (e.g., Chaney, 2008; Helpman et al., 2008; Melitz and Ottaviano,
2008). In all these models, wages are either equalized or assumed to differ exogenously via Ricardian differences
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how and through which economic channels various exogenous shocks would affect the different
Canadian provinces and U.S. states. We provide two such ‘counterfactual analyses’. First, we
simulate the effects of eliminating the trade distortion generated by the Canada-U.S. border on
regional trade flows, which represents a hypothetical scenario where only distance still matters
as an impediment to trade. We compute a series of bilateral border effects which summarize
how trade flows between any two regions (within or across countries) would be affected by
the hypothetical border removal. These bilateral border effects can then be decomposed
into a ‘pure’ border effect, relative and absolute wage effects, and a selection effect, thereby
providing a detailed account of which factors drive these effects in the first place. We show
that both endogenous wage responses and firm selection systematically increase measured U.S.
and decrease measured Canadian border effects as compared to previous estimates from the
literature. Second, we quantify the impacts of this full removal of the Canada-U.S. border
on other key economic variables at the regional level. In particular, we show that all regions
would experience welfare gains since average productivity increases and product diversity
expands everywhere, but that some regions quite naturally gain more than others. Finally, we
investigate how local market size affects the equilibrium via changes in regional populations.
To this end, we hold trade frictions fixed at their initial levels and consider how the observed
population changes between 1993 and 2007 affect the different provinces and states. We find
that the western Canadian provinces and the southern U.S. states gain the most in terms of
productivity and wages, whereas small peripheral regions like Newfoundland may experience
productivity and welfare losses.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 deals with the closed economy
case. In Section 3 we extend it to a multi-country framework. Section 4 derives the gravity
equation system, describes the data, and presents the estimation procedure. In Section 5 we
illustrate the counterfactual experiment of removing the border. Section 6 concludes.
2 Closed economy
Consider a closed economy with a final consumption good, provided as a continuum of hori-
zontally differentiated varieties. We denote by Ω the endogenously determined set of available
varieties, with measure N . There are L consumers, each of whom supplies inelastically one
unit of labor, which is the only factor of production.
in some costlessly tradable numeraire sector. Balistreri and Hillberry (2007) are, to the best of our knowledge,
the first to structurally estimate a gravity equation with endogenous wages, but they neglect firm heterogeneity.
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2.1 Preferences and demands
All consumers have identical preferences which display ‘love of variety’ and give rise to demands
with variable elasticities. Following Behrens and Murata (2007), the utility maximization
problem of a representative consumer is given by:
max
q(j), j∈Ω
U ≡
∫
Ω
[
1− e−αq(j)
]
dj s.t.
∫
Ω
p(j)q(j)dj = E, (1)
where E denotes expenditure; p(j) > 0 and q(j) ≥ 0 stand for the price and the per capita
consumption of variety j; and α > 0 is a parameter. As shown by Behrens and Murata (2007),
solving (1) yields the following demand functions:
q(i) =
E
Np
−
1
α
{
ln
[
p(i)
Np
]
+ h
}
, ∀i ∈ Ω, (2)
where
p ≡
1
N
∫
Ω
p(j)dj and h ≡ −
∫
Ω
ln
[
p(j)
Np
]
p(j)
Np
dj
denote the average price and the differential entropy of the price distribution, respectively.
Since marginal utility at zero consumption is bounded, the demand for a variety need not be
positive. Indeed, as can be seen from (2), the demand for variety i is positive if and only if its
price is lower than the reservation price pd. Formally,
q(i) > 0 ⇐⇒ p(i) < pd ≡ Np e
αE
Np
−h. (3)
Note that the reservation price pd is a function of the price aggregates p and h. Combining
expressions (2) and (3) allows us to express the demand for variety i concisely as follows:
q(i) =
1
α
ln
[
pd
p(i)
]
. (4)
2.2 Technology and market structure
The labor market is assumed to be perfectly competitive so that all firms take the wage rate w
as given. Prior to production, each firm engages in research and development, which requires
a fixed amount F of labor paid at the market wage. Each entrant discovers its marginal labor
requirement m(i) ≥ 0 only after making this irreversible investment. We assume that m(i) is
drawn from a common and known, continuously differentiable distribution G. Since research
and development costs are sunk, a firm will remain active in the market provided it can charge
a price p(i) above marginal cost m(i)w.
Each surviving firm sets its price to maximize operating profit
pi(i) = L
[
p(i)−m(i)w
]
q(i), (5)
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where q(i) is given by (4). Since there is a continuum of firms, no individual firm has any
impact on pd so that the first-order conditions for (operating) profit maximization are given
by:
ln
[
pd
p(i)
]
=
p(i)−m(i)w
p(i)
, ∀i ∈ Ω. (6)
A price distribution satisfying (6) is called a price equilibrium. Multiplying both sides of (6)
by p(i), integrating over Ω, and using (4) yield the average price as follows:
p = mw +
αE
N
, (7)
where m ≡ (1/N)
∫
Ω
m(j)dj denotes the average marginal labor requirement of the surviving
firms. Observe that expression (7) displays pro-competitive effects, i.e., the average price is
decreasing in the mass of surviving firms N .
Equations (4) and (6) imply that q(i) = (1/α)[1−m(i)w/p(i)], which allows us to derive
the upper and lower bounds for the marginal labor requirement. The maximum output is given
by q(i) = 1/α at m(i) = 0. The minimum output is given by q(i) = 0 at p(i) = m(i)w, which
by (6) implies that p(i) = pd. Therefore, the cutoff marginal labor requirement is defined
as md ≡ pd/w. A firm that draws md is indifferent between producing and not producing,
whereas all firms with a draw below (resp., above) md remain in (resp., exit from) the market.
Since firms differ only by their marginal labor requirement, we can express all firm-level
variables in terms of m. Solving (6) by using the Lambert W function, defined as ϕ =
W (ϕ)eW (ϕ), the profit-maximizing prices and quantities as well as operating profits can be
expressed as follows:
p(m) =
mw
W
, q(m) =
1
α
(1−W ), pi(m) =
Lmw
α
(
W−1 +W − 2
)
, (8)
where we suppress the argument em/md of W to alleviate notation (see Appendix A.1 for
the derivations). It is readily verified that W ′ > 0 for all non-negative arguments and that
W (0) = 0 and W (e) = 1. Hence, 0 ≤ W ≤ 1 if 0 ≤ m ≤ md.4 The expressions in (8) then
show that a firm with draw md charges a price equal to marginal cost, faces zero demand,
and earns zero profit. Since W ′ > 0, we readily obtain ∂p(m)/∂m > 0, ∂q(m)/∂m < 0 and
∂pi(m)/∂m < 0. In words, firms with better draws charge lower prices, sell larger quantities,
and earn higher operating profits than firms with worse draws.
2.3 Equilibrium
We now state the equilibrium conditions for the closed economy, which consist of zero expected
profits and labor market clearing. First, given the mass of entrants NE , the mass of surviving
4Clearly, ϕ = W (ϕ)eW (ϕ) implies that W (ϕ) ≥ 0 for all ϕ ≥ 0. Taking logarithms on both sides and
differentiating yield W ′(ϕ) =W (ϕ)/{ϕ[W (ϕ) + 1]} > 0 for all ϕ > 0. Finally, we have 0 =W (0)eW (0), which
implies W (0) = 0, and e =W (e)eW (e), which implies W (e) = 1.
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firms can be written as N = NEG(md). Using (5), the zero expected profit condition for each
firm is given by
L
∫ md
0
[p(m)−mw] q(m)dG(m) = Fw, (9)
which, combined with (8), can be rewritten as
L
α
∫ md
0
m
(
W−1 +W − 2
)
dG(m) = F. (10)
As the left-hand side of (10) is strictly increasing in md from 0 to ∞, there always exists
a unique equilibrium cutoff (see Appendix A.2). Furthermore, the labor market clearing
condition is given by:5
NE
[
L
∫ md
0
mq(m)dG(m) + F
]
= L, (11)
which combined with (8) can be rewritten as
NE
[
L
α
∫ md
0
m (1−W ) dG(m) + F
]
= L. (12)
Given the equilibrium cutoff md, equation (12) can be uniquely solved for NE .
How does population size affect firms’ entry and survival probabilities? Using the equilib-
rium conditions (10) and (12), we can show that a larger L leads to more entrants NE and a
smaller cutoff md, respectively (see Appendix A.3). The effect of population size on the mass
of surviving firms N is in general ambiguous. However, under the commonly made assumption
that firms’ productivity draws 1/m follow a Pareto distribution
G(m) =
( m
mmax
)k
,
with upper bound mmax > 0 and shape parameter k ≥ 1, we can show that N is increasing
in L.6 Using this distributional assumption, we readily obtain closed-form solutions for the
equilibrium cutoff and mass of entrants:
md =
[
αF (mmax)k
κ2L
] 1
k+1
and NE =
κ2
κ1 + κ2
L
F
,
5Note that using (9) and the budget constraint NE
∫md
0 p(m)q(m)dG(m) = E, we obtain EL/(wN
E) =
L
∫md
0 mq(m)dG(m) + F which, together with (11), yields E = w in equilibrium.
6The Pareto distribution has been extensively used in the previous literature on heterogeneous firms
(Bernard et al., 2007; Helpman et al., 2008; Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008). Such a distribution is also consistent
with the U.S. firm size distribution (see Axtell, 2001).
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where κ1 and κ2 are positive constants that solely depend on k (see Appendices B.1 and B.2).
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The mass of surviving firms is then given as follows:
N =
κ
1
k+1
2
κ1 + κ2
( α
mmax
) k
k+1
(
L
F
) 1
k+1
,
which is increasing in population size. One can further check that N is decreasing in the fixed
labor requirement F and in the upper bound mmax. Finally, since m = [k/(k + 1)]md holds
when productivity follows a Pareto distribution, a larger population also maps into higher
average productivity.
3 Open economy
We now turn to the open economy case. As dealing with two regions only marginally alleviates
the notational burden, we first derive the equilibrium conditions for the general case with K
asymmetric regions that we use when taking our model to the data. We then present some
clear-cut analytical results for the special case of two asymmetric regions in order to guide the
intuition for the general case.
3.1 Preferences and demands
Preferences are analogous to the ones described in the previous section. Let psr(i) and qsr(i)
denote the price and the per capita consumption of variety i when it is produced in region s
and consumed in region r. It is readily verified that the demand functions in the open economy
case are given as follows:
qsr(i) =
Er
N crpr
−
1
α
{
ln
[
psr(i)
N crpr
]
+ hr
}
, ∀i ∈ Ωsr,
where N cr is the mass of varieties consumed in region r; Ωsr denotes the set of varieties produced
in region s and consumed in region r; and
pr ≡
1
N cr
∑
s
∫
Ωsr
psr(j)dj and hr ≡ −
∑
s
∫
Ωsr
ln
[
psr(j)
N crpr
]
psr(j)
N crpr
dj
denote the average price and the differential entropy of the price distribution of all varieties
consumed in region r. As in the closed economy case, the demand for domestic variety i (resp.,
foreign variety j) is positive if and only if the price of variety i (resp., variety j) is lower than
the reservation price pdr . Formally,
qrr(i) > 0 ⇐⇒ prr(i) < p
d
r and qsr(j) > 0 ⇐⇒ psr(j) < p
d
r ,
7For this solution to be consistent, we must ensure that md ≤ mmax, i.e., mmax ≥ (αF/L)1/k.
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where pdr ≡ N
c
rpre
αEr/(Ncr pr)−hr is a function of the price aggregates pr and hr. The demands
for domestic and foreign varieties can then be concisely expressed as follows:
qrr(i) =
1
α
ln
[
pdr
prr(i)
]
and qsr(j) =
1
α
ln
[
pdr
psr(j)
]
. (13)
3.2 Technology and market structure
Technology and the entry process are identical to the ones described in Section 2. We assume
that shipments from r to s are subject to trade costs τrs > 1 for all r and s, that markets are
segmented, and that firms are free to price discriminate.
Firms in region r independently draw their productivities from a region-specific distribution
Gr. Assuming that firms incur trade costs in terms of labor, the operating profit of firm i in r
is given by:
pir(i) =
∑
s
pirs(i) =
∑
s
Lsqrs(i) [prs(i)− τrsmr(i)wr] . (14)
Each firm maximizes (14) with respect to its prices prs(i) separately. Since it has no impact
on the price aggregates and on the wages, the first-order conditions are given by:
ln
[
pds
prs(i)
]
=
prs(i)− τrsmr(i)wr
prs(i)
, ∀i ∈ Ωrs. (15)
We first solve for the average price in region r. To do so, multiply (15) by prs(i), use (13),
integrate over Ωrs, and finally sum the resulting expressions to obtain
pr ≡
1
N cr
∑
s
∫
Ωsr
psr(j)dj =
1
N cr
∑
s
τsrws
∫
Ωsr
ms(j)dj +
αEr
N cr
, (16)
where the first term is the average of marginal delivered costs in region r. Expression (16)
shows that pr is decreasing in the mass N
c
r of firms competing in region r, which is similar to
the result on pro-competitive effects established in the closed economy case.
Equations (13) and (15) imply that qrs(i) = (1/α)[1−τrsmr(i)wr/prs(i)], which shows that
qrs(i) = 0 at prs(i) = τrsmr(i)wr. It then follows from (15) that prs(i) = p
d
s. Hence, a firm
located in r with draw mxrs ≡ p
d
s/(τrswr) is just indifferent between selling and not selling in
region s. All firms with draws below mxrs are productive enough to sell to region s. In what
follows, we refer to mxss ≡ m
d
s as the domestic cutoff in region s, whereas m
x
rs with r 6= s is
the export cutoff. Export and domestic cutoffs are linked as follows:
mxrs =
τss
τrs
ws
wr
mds . (17)
Expression (17) reveals how trade costs and wage differentials affect firms’ ability to break into
foreign markets. When wages are equalized (wr = ws) and internal trade is costless (τss = 1),
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all export cutoffs must fall short of the domestic cutoffs since τrs > 1. In that case, breaking
into any foreign market is always harder than selling domestically. However, in the presence of
wage differentials and internal trade costs, the domestic and the foreign cutoffs can no longer
be clearly ranked. The usual ranking, namely that exporting to s is more difficult than selling
domestically in s, prevails only when τssws < τrswr.
The first-order conditions (15) can be solved as in the closed economy case. Switching to
notation in terms of m, the profit-maximizing prices and quantities as well as operating profits
are given by:
prs(m) =
τrsmwr
W
, qrs(m) =
1
α
(1−W ) , pirs =
Lτrsmwr
α
(W−1 +W − 2), (18)
where W denotes the Lambert W function with argument eτrsmwr/p
d
s. It is readily verified
that more productive firms again charge lower prices, sell larger quantities, and earn higher
operating profits.
Observe that in an open economy, the masses of varieties consumed and produced in each
region need not be the same. Given a mass of entrants NEr , only N
p
r = N
E
r Gr (maxs {m
x
rs})
firms survive, namely those which are productive enough to sell at least in one market. Finally,
the mass of varieties consumed in region r is given by
N cr =
∑
s
NEs Gs(m
x
sr), (19)
which, contrary to Npr , depends on the distributions Gs of all its trading partners.
3.3 Equilibrium
The zero expected profit condition for each firm in region r is given by∑
s
Ls
∫ mxrs
0
[prs(m)− τrsmwr] qrs(m)dGr(m) = Frwr, (20)
where Fr is the region-specific fixed labor requirement. Furthermore, each labor market clears
in equilibrium, which yields
NEr
[∑
s
Lsτrs
∫ mxrs
0
mqrs(m)dGr(m) + Fr
]
= Lr. (21)
Last, trade is balanced for each region:
NEr
∑
s 6=r
Ls
∫ mxrs
0
prs(m)qrs(m)dGr(m) = Lr
∑
s 6=r
NEs
∫ mxsr
0
psr(m)qsr(m)dGs(m).
As in the foregoing section, we can restate the equilibrium conditions using the Lambert W
function (see Appendix C for details).
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In what follows, we assume that productivity draws 1/m follow a Pareto distribution with
identical shape parameters k ≥ 1. However, to capture local technological possibilities, we
allow the upper bounds to differ across regions, i.e., Gr(m) = (m/m
max
r )
k. A lower mmaxr
implies that firms in region r have a higher probability of drawing a better productivity.
Under the Pareto distribution, the equilibrium conditions can be greatly simplified. First,
using the expressions in Appendices B.1 and C.1, labor market clearing requires that
NEr
[
κ1
α (mmaxr )
k
∑
s
Lsτrs
(
τss
τrs
ws
wr
mds
)k+1
+ Fr
]
= Lr. (22)
Second, using Appendices B.2 and C.2, zero expected profits imply that
µmaxr ≡
αFr (m
max
r )
k
κ2
=
∑
s
Lsτrs
(
τss
τrs
ws
wr
mds
)k+1
, (23)
where µr is a simple monotonic transformation of the upper bounds. Last, using Appendices
B.3 and C.3, balanced trade requires that
NEr wr
(mmaxr )
k
∑
s 6=r
Lsτrs
(
τss
τrs
ws
wr
mds
)k+1
= Lr
∑
s 6=r
τsr
NEs ws
(mmaxs )
k
(
τrr
τsr
wr
ws
mdr
)k+1
. (24)
The 3K conditions (22)–(24) depend on 3K unknowns: the wages wr, the masses of entrants
NEr , and the domestic cutoffs m
d
r . The export cutoffs m
x
rs can then be computed using (17).
Combining (22) and (23) immediately shows that
NEr =
κ2
κ1 + κ2
Lr
Fr
. (25)
The mass of entrants in region r therefore positively depends on that region’s size Lr and
negatively on its fixed labor requirement Fr.
Adding the term in r that is missing on both sides of (24), and using (23) and (25), we
obtain the following equilibrium relationship:
1
(mdr)
k+1
=
∑
s
Lsτrr
(
τrr
τsr
wr
ws
)k
1
µmaxs
. (26)
Expressions (23) and (26) summarize how wages, upper bounds, cutoffs, trade costs and
population sizes are related in general equilibrium.
3.4 Two-region case
Our model allows for clear-cut comparative static results with two asymmetric regions. Using
(23)–(25), an equilibrium can be characterized by a system of three equations with three
11
unknowns ω ≡ w1/w2, m
d
1 and m
d
2 as follows:(
w1
w2
)2k+1
=
(
τ21
τ12
)k (
τ22
τ11
)k+1(
md2
md1
)k+1(
µmax2
µmax1
)
(27)
µmaxr = Lrτrr
(
mdr
)k+1
+ Lsτrs
(
τss
τrs
ws
wr
mds
)k+1
, (28)
for r = 1, 2 and s 6= r. Equation (28) for regions 1 and 2 can readily be solved for the cutoffs
as a function of ω:
(md1)
k+1 =
µmax1
L1τ11
1− ρ
(
τ22
τ12
)k
ω−(k+1)
1−
(
τ11τ22
τ12τ21
)k and (md2)k+1 = µmax2L2τ22
1− ρ−1
(
τ11
τ21
)k
ωk+1
1−
(
τ22τ11
τ21τ12
)k , (29)
where ρ ≡ µmax2 /µ
max
1 captures relative technological possibilities. A larger ρ implies, ceteris
paribus, that firms in region 2 face a higher probability of drawing a worse productivity than
those in region 1. Substituting the cutoffs (29) into (27) and simplifying then yields
LHS ≡ ωk = ρ
L1
L2
(
τ21
τ12
)k
ρτ−k11 − τ
−k
21 ω
k+1
τ−k22 ω
k+1 − ρτ−k12
≡ RHS. (30)
Assume that intraregional trade is less costly than interregional trade, i.e., τ11 < τ21 and
τ22 < τ12. Then, the RHS of (30) is decreasing in ω on its relevant domain, whereas the
LHS is increasing in ω. Hence, there exists a unique equilibrium such that the equilibrium
relative wage ω∗ is bounded by relative trade costs τ22/τ12 and τ21/τ11, relative technological
possibilities ρ, and the shape parameter k (see Appendix A.4).
Since the RHS of (30) is decreasing, the comparative static results are straightforward to
derive. In Appendix A.5 we show that, everything else equal: (i) the larger region has the
higher wage; (ii) the region with better technological possibilities has the higher wage; (iii)
higher internal trade costs in one region reduce its relative wage; (iv) better access for one
region to the other market raises its relative wage; and (v) wages converge as bilateral trade
barriers fall.
4 Estimation
In this section we take the model with K asymmetric regions to the data. To this end, we first
derive a theory-based gravity equation with general equilibrium constraints. Using Canada-
U.S. regional trade flow data, we then structurally estimate trade friction parameters as well
as other parameters of the model.8 In the next section we turn to counterfactual analyses,
8Since our model is one of intra-industry trade, it is better suited to analyze trade among similar regions
where factor proportions are less likely to matter. Furthermore, the Canada-U.S. regional trade data has been
widely used in the literature, which makes it possible to compare our results to existing ones.
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where we consider the impacts of a decrease in trade frictions as well as changes in population
sizes on various economic variables.
4.1 Gravity equation system
Using the results established in the previous section, the value of exports from region r to
region s is given by
Xrs = N
E
r Ls
∫ mxsr
0
prs(m)qrs(m)dGr(m).
Using (18), (25), and the Pareto distribution for Gr(m), we obtain the following gravity
equation:9
Xrs
LrLs
= τ−krs τ
k+1
ss (ws/wr)
k+1wr
(
mds
)k+1
(µmaxr )
−1 . (31)
As can be seen from (31), exports depend on bilateral trade costs τrs, internal trade costs in
the destination τss, origin and destination wages wr and ws, destination productivity m
d
s , and
origin technological possibilities µmaxr . A higher relative wage ws/wr raises the value of exports
as firms in r face relatively lower production costs, whereas a higher absolute wage wr raises
the value of exports by increasing export prices prs. Furthermore, a larger m
d
s raises the value
of exports since firms located in the destination are on average less productive. Last, a lower
µmaxr implies that firms in region r have higher expected productivity, which quite naturally
raises the value of their exports.
From conditions (23) and (26) we obtain the following general equilibrium constraints:
1
(mds)
k+1
=
∑
v
Lvτ
−k
vs τ
k+1
ss
(
ws
wv
)k
1
µmaxv
s = 1, 2, . . .K (32)
µmaxr =
∑
v
Lvτ
−k
rv τ
k+1
vv
(
wv
wr
)k+1 (
mdv
)k+1
r = 1, 2. . . .K (33)
The gravity equation system consists of the gravity equation (31) and the 2K general equilib-
rium constraints (32) and (33) that summarize the interactions between the 2K endogenous
variables, wages and cutoffs. Expressions (32) and (33) are reminiscent of the constraints
in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), who argue that general equilibrium interdependencies
need to be taken into account when conducting counterfactual analysis based on the gravity
equation.10 One of our contributions is to go a step further by extending their approach to
9Contrary to the standard gravity literature, we do not move the GDPs but instead the population sizes
to the left-hand side. Applying the former approach to our model would amount to assuming that wages are
exogenous in the gravity estimation, which is not the case in general equilibrium (see Bergstrand, 1985, for an
early contribution on this issue).
10It might be tempting to treat wr, ws, m
d
s and µ
max
r as fixed effects in equation (31), as has been frequently
done before. However, although fixed effect estimation yields consistent estimates for trade friction parameters,
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include firm heterogeneity and endogenous wages. Note that expression (31) is similar to
gravity equations that have been derived in previous models with heterogeneous firms. These
models rely, however, on exogenous wages (Chaney, 2008; Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008) and
also often disregard general equilibrium constraints when being estimated (Helpman et al.,
2008). Furthermore, models with endogenous wages such as Balistreri and Hillberry (2007)
do not consider firm heterogeneity.
4.2 Estimation procedure
To estimate the gravity equation system (31)–(33) requires data for trade flows and population
sizes. We also need to specify trade costs τrs. In what follows, we stick to standard practice
by assuming that τrs ≡ d
γ
rse
θbrs , where drs stands for distance between r and s and where brs
is a border dummy valued 1 if r and s are not in the same country and 0 otherwise. This
specification, which assumes that regional trade is not only affected by physical distance but
also by the presence of the Canada-U.S. border, allows us to relate our first counterfactual to
the vast literature on border effects following McCallum (1995).
There are three key issues for the estimation. First, we need to recover a value for the
shape parameter k, which requires statistics computed from micro-level data. Such figures for
the U.S. are provided by Bernard et al. (2003) and Bernard et al. (2005) from 1992 Census
data. The precise choice for k is discussed in the next subsection.
Second, there exists no data for µmaxr since it depends on the unobservables α, Fr and
mmaxr . To address this issue, we use the general equilibrium constraints (32)–(33). Ideally, we
would plug data for µmaxr into these 2K constraints to solve for the 2K endogenous variables
wr and m
d
s . However, as the µ
max
r are unobservable, we rely instead on data for the K
endogenous cutoffs mds . This allows us to solve the 2K equilibrium constraints (32) and (33)
for theoretically consistent values of the 2K variables wr and µ
max
r .
Last, the estimates of the trade friction parameters γ and θ depend on wr, µ
max
r and m
d
r ,
which depend themselves on the estimates of γ and θ. Put differently, the constraints (32)
and (33) include the trade friction parameters, but to estimate the parameters of the gravity
equation we need the solution to these constraints. We tackle this problem by estimating the
gravity equation system iteratively.
In sum, our estimation procedure consists of the following four steps:
1. Given our specification of τrs, the gravity equation (31) can be rewritten in log-linear
this approach cannot be used for counterfactual analysis since the effect of the counterfactual on the estimated
fixed effects is not known. In our approach, the endogenous responses of wages and cutoffs are crucial when
evaluating the counterfactual scenarios.
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stochastic form as follows:
ln
(
Xrs
LrLs
)
= −kγ ln drs−kθbrs + ζ
1
r + ζ
2
s + εrs, (34)
where all terms specific to the origin and the destination are collapsed into exporter and
importer fixed effects ζ1r and ζ
2
s ; and where εrs is an error term with the usual properties.
From (34), we obtain initial unconstrained estimates of the parameters (γ̂′, θ̂′).11
2. Using the initial estimates (γ̂′, θ̂′) and the observed cutoffs mds in (32) and (33), we solve
simultaneously for the equilibrium wages and the upper bounds (ŵ′r, µ̂
max
r
′
).
3. We use the computed values (ŵ′r, µ̂
max
r
′
) to estimate the gravity equation (31) as follows:
ln
(
Xrs
LrLs
)
+ klnŵr
′ − (k + 1)lnŵs
′ − lnmds + ln µ̂
max
r
′
= −γk ln drs + γ(k + 1) ln drr − kθbrs + εrs,
which yields constrained estimates (γ̂′′, θ̂′′).
4. We iterate through steps 2 to 3 until convergence to obtain (γ̂, θ̂) and (ŵr, µ̂maxr ).
The estimates of trade frictions (γ̂, θ̂) and of wages and upper bounds (ŵr, µ̂maxr ) are consistent
with theory as they take into account all the equilibrium information of the model. We then
have all the elements needed to conduct counterfactual analyses and we can retrieve the fitted
(predicted) value of trade flows X̂rs for all regions.
4.3 Data
We use the same regional trade data as Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) and Feenstra
(2004). The dataset contains detailed information for 51 U.S. regions (50 states plus the
District of Columbia) and 10 Canadian provinces.12 The variables consist of bilateral trade
flows Xrs and internal absorption Xrr for the year 1993, and geographical distances between
regional capitals drs. We augment this dataset by adding regional population sizes Lr in 1993,
which are obtained from Statistics Canada and the U.S. Census Bureau. Internal distances
are measured as drr = (1/4)mins 6=r{drs} like in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). As
a robustness check we also consider the alternative measure drr = (2/3)
√
surfacer/pi as in
Redding and Venables (2004).
11It is worth emphasizing that our estimates do not depend on the starting values used for γ and θ. However,
the fixed effects estimates provide a reasonable ‘guess’ for the starting values and allow for faster convergence
of the iterative procedure.
12Because of their very small population sizes and predominant reliance on natural resources, we exclude
Yukon and Northwest Territories in what follows.
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Under the Pareto distribution, the domestic cutoff in each region is proportional to the
inverse of the average productivity, i.e., mdr = [(k+1)/k]mr. We measure mr by using the GDP
per employee in Canadian dollars for each state and province in 1993 obtained from Statistics
Canada and the U.S. Census Bureau. We choose the shape parameter k as follows. First, if
productivity 1/m is distributed Pareto with parameter k, then log(1/m) follows an exponential
distribution with parameter k and standard deviation 1/k (see Norman et al., 1994). Therefore,
one can estimate k by computing the standard deviation of log productivity across plants. The
standard deviation of log U.S. plant-level labor productivity in 1992, provided by Bernard et
al. (2003, Table 2), suggests that k is around 1.4. However, as pointed out by these authors,
productivity is likely to be measured with error, thus delivering a downward biased estimate
of k. To cope with this problem, Bernard et al. (2003) calibrate the parameter governing the
variance of productivity in order to match the size and productivity advantage of exporters.
Since they work with a Fre´chet distribution, we can retrieve the relevant value of k = 3.6
for our Pareto distribution.13 In what follows, we consider k = 3.6 as our baseline value. As
robustness checks, we also consider k = 1.4 and k = 6.5. As will become clear, our key results
are little sensitive to the choice of k.
To estimate the gravity equation system, we restrict ourselves to the same subset of 40
regions used by both Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) and Feenstra (2004). Doing so allows
for better comparability of results. In addition, it circumvents the problem of missing and zero
flows which are mainly concentrated on the 21 remaining regions in the sample. Note, however,
that once we obtain initial unconstrained estimates for the structural parameters (γ̂′, θ̂′), we
can solve (32) and (33) for the wages and upper bounds (ŵr
′, µ̂maxr
′
) even when we have no
data on the trade flows between regions r and s. We can hence use a maximum amount
of information, namely the full set of 61 regions, in the general equilibrium constraints.14
Furthermore, we can retrieve the predicted value of trade flows X̂rs for all regions (even those
not in the sample), once we have estimated the gravity equation system. Even when focusing
on the 40 regions, we still have to deal with 49 zero trade flows out of 1600 observations. Since
there is no generally agreed-upon methodology to deal with this problem (see, e.g., Anderson
and van Wincoop, 2004; Disdier and Head, 2008), we include a dummy variable for zero flows
in the regressions.15 As a robustness check, we estimate the system by dropping the 49 zero
13In Bernard et al. (2003), the lowest cost exporter is the only supplier in any destination. If all potential
exporters draw their productivity from a Pareto distribution with shape parameter k, then the productivity
distribution of the lowest cost exporter is Fre´chet with shape parameter k (see Norman et al., 1994).
14See Tables 3 and 4 for a list of the regions used in the gravity equation (‘In Gravity sample’) and for a list
of regions not used in the gravity equation but used in the equilibrium constraints (‘Out of Gravity sample’).
15Although this is somewhat crude, alternative methods like truncating the sample are not known to perform
better or to be theoretically more sound. Note that our zeros are unlikely to be ‘true zeros’, as this would
imply no aggregate manufacturing trade between several U.S. states. In the case of ‘true zeros’, a Heckman
procedure would perform better (Helpman et al., 2008).
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flows. Results are little sensitive to the specification used, thus suggesting that the zero flows
are true outliers and do not contain relevant information.
4.4 Estimation results
Our estimation results for the gravity equation system are summarized in Table 1. Column 1
presents the benchmark case, whereas columns 2-6 contain alternative specifications used as
robustness checks. As can be seen from column 1, all coefficients have the correct sign and
are precisely estimated. In our benchmark case, the estimated distance elasticity is −1.2287,
which implies that γ̂ = 0.3413. The border coefficient estimate is 1.6809, which implies that
θ̂ = 0.4669. Note that our estimated coefficient is very similar to the one of 1.65 obtained by
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). However, as shown later, the impacts of a border removal
on trade flows differ substantially once endogenous wages and firm selection are taken into
account.
Insert Table 1 about here.
Columns 2 and 3 report results for different values of k. Column 4 presents results when
we use the alternative measure for internal distances, whereas colums 5 and 6 present results
obtained when we include internal absorption Xrr and when we exclude zero trade flows,
respectively. Note that the coefficient of the border dummy remains almost unchanged across
all specifications, with adjusted R2 values close to 0.9.
4.5 Model fit
As stated in the foregoing, we solve the general equilibrium constraints for the wages and upper
bounds (ŵr, µ̂maxr ). While there is no data for the latter, we can compare the relative wages
generated by our model with observed ones.16 In our benchmark case, the correlation is 0.68.
Thus, the predicted relative wages match observed ones fairly well. Our model also predicts
an average exporter share of 1.24% for the U.S.17 This fits decently with the fact reported
by Bernard et al. (2005) that 2.6% of all U.S. firms were exporters in 1993. Although the
prediction of our model is slightly lower, one should keep in mind that their figure includes
exporters to all foreign countries and not just to Canada.
16We construct average yearly wages across provinces and states using hourly wage data from Statistics
Canada and the Bureau of Labor Statistics. To match the unit of measurement of trade and GDP data, we
compute average yearly wages in million Canadian dollars based on an average of 1930 hours worked yearly in
Canada, and 2080 hours worked yearly in the U.S. in 1993.
17The share of exporters in a U.S. state is defined as the share of firms selling to at least one Canadian
province. Formally, it is given by Gr(maxs∈CA{m
x
rs})/Gr(maxs{m
x
rs}). The share of U.S. exporters is then
computed as the population weighted average of the states’ exporter shares. All figures for the Canadian
provinces are computed in an analogous way.
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5 Counterfactual analysis
Having estimated the gravity equation system, we now turn to a counterfactual analysis in the
spirit of Bernard et al. (2003) and Del Gatto et al. (2006). We first investigate the impacts
of reducing trade frictions generated by the Canada-U.S. border to zero. It is clear that such
trade integration would induce various general equilibrium effects, and that regions would
be affected differently depending on geography, technology and population sizes. Second,
we investigate the impacts of regional population changes between 1993 and 2007, holding
trade frictions fixed at their intial level. In both cases, we quantify the changes in wages,
productivity, markups, the share of exporters, the mass of varieties produced and consumed,
as well as welfare.
5.1 The impacts of removing the border on trade flows
McCallum’s (1995) seminal work on border effects shows that, conditional on regional GDP
and distance, trade between Canadian provinces is roughly 22 times larger than trade between
Canadian provinces and U.S. states. Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) argue that this
estimate is substantially upward biased due to the omission of general equilibrium constraints.
They find that, on average, the border increases trade between Canadian provinces ‘only’ by
a factor of 10.5 when compared to trade between Canadian provinces and U.S. states. The
corresponding number for the U.S. is 2.56. We now investigate how these figures are modified
when endogenous wages and firm selection are taken into account.
5.1.1 Computing border effects
We define bilateral border effects as the ratio of trade flows from r to s in a borderless world
to those in a world with borders:
Brs ≡
X˜rs
X̂rs
= ek
bθbrs
(
w˜s/w˜r
ŵs/ŵr
)k+1(
w˜r
ŵr
)(
m˜ds
mds
)k+1
, (35)
where variables with a tilde refer to values in a borderless world and where variables with a
hat denote estimates. To compute Brs we first use the estimated wages ŵr and the observed
cutoffs mds in the presence of the border to obtain the relevant information for the initial fitted
trade flows X̂rs in (35). Second, holding the shape parameter k as well as the estimated upper
bound µ̂maxr and trade frictions (γ̂, θ̂) constant, we solve (32) and (33) by setting brs = 0 for
all r and s. This yields the wages w˜r and the cutoffs m˜
d
s that would prevail in a borderless
world. Plugging these values into (35), we obtain 61× 61 = 3721 bilateral border effects, each
of which gives the change in the trade flows from r to s after the border removal.
The bilateral border effects Brs are typically greater than one when regions r and s are
in different countries. The reason is that exports from region r to region s partly replace
18
domestic sales as international trade frictions are reduced. For analogous reasons, the values
of Brs are typically less than one when r and s are in the same country. Table 2 provides some
descriptive statistics on the computed bilateral border effects. One can see that the various
specifications yield virtually identically distributed and strongly correlated bilateral border
effects, thus showing that the results are robust to the choice of k.
Insert Table 2 about here.
In order to evaluate the impact of the border removal on overall Canadian and U.S. trade
flows, we need to aggregate bilateral border effects at the national level. As an intermediate
step, we first define the regional border effect for Canadian province r as follows:
Br =
∑
s∈US X˜rs/
∑
s∈US X̂rs∑
s∈CA X˜rs/
∑
s∈CA X̂rs
=
∑
s∈US λ
US
rs Brs∑
s∈CA λ
CA
rs Brs
,
where λUSrs = X̂rs/
∑
s∈US X̂rs and λ
CA
rs = X̂rs/
∑
s∈CA X̂rs are the fitted trade shares. The
numerator is the trade weighted average of international bilateral border effects, whereas the
denominator is the trade weighted average of the intranational Brs. It can be easily verified
that the national border effect for Canada can be simplified as follows:
BCA ≡
∑
r∈CA
∑
s∈US X˜rs/
∑
r∈CA
∑
s∈US X̂rs∑
r∈CA
∑
s∈CA X˜rs/
∑
r∈CA
∑
s∈CA X̂rs
=
1
KCA
∑
r∈CA
Br,
where KCA is the number of Canadian provinces. An analogous definition applies to the U.S.
We find that BCA = 7.15 while BUS = 4.03. Below we compare these findings with the
corresponding figures provided by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), who report a national
border effect of 2.56 for the U.S. and 10.5 for Canada, respectively.18
5.1.2 Decomposing bilateral border effects
What drives bilateral border effects? As can be seen from expression (35), Brs can be decom-
posed into four components:
• The pure border effect: ek
bθbrs
• The relative wage effect: ∆(ws/wr) ≡ [(w˜s/w˜r)/(ŵs/ŵr)]
k+1
• The absolute wage effect: ∆wr ≡ w˜r/ŵr
18Strictly speaking, our definition of national border effect differs from that of Anderson and van Wincoop
(2003). When using their definition in terms of geometric means (see Feenstra, 2004), we obtain 7.18 for
Canada and 4.02 for the U.S. The advantage of our definition of national border effect is that it precisely
measures the (multiplicative) impact of the border removal on trade flows.
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• The selection effect: ∆mds ≡
(
m˜ds/m
d
s
)k+1
Insert Table 3 about here.
Table 3 illustrates this decomposition for our benchmark case. The left half of the table
reports the components of Brs for exports from British Columbia (BC) to all possible destina-
tions. Consider, for example, the bilateral border effect with Washington (WA). First, there
is a pure border effect of 5.3704, i.e., the value of exports from BC to WA would rise by a
factor of 5.3704 after the border removal. This is the bilateral border effect that would prevail
if endogenous changes in wages and cutoffs were not taken into account. Second, there are
relative and absolute wage effects. On the one hand, the relative wage effect reduces the value
of BC exports to WA by a factor of 0.8500. As the relative wage in BC rises, BC firms become
less competitive in WA due to relatively higher production costs, which reduces exports by
15%. The absolute wage effect, on the other hand, raises BC exports by a factor of 1.0451 as
the higher wage is reflected in the higher prices. When taken together, these two wage effects
reduce the bilateral border effect from BC to WA by about 11% (as 0.8500×1.0451 = 0.8883).
Put differently, neglecting the endogenous reaction of wages to the border removal leads to
overstating the bilateral border effects by about 11%. Finally, there is a selection effect. The
border removal lowers the cutoff productivity level for firms to survive in WA. In other words,
trade integration induces tougher selection and makes it harder for BC firms to sell in WA.
This selection effect reduces the export value by a factor of 0.9081. Hence, the selection effect
further reduces the border effect by about 9.2%. The bilateral border effect is therefore given
by 5.3704×0.8500×1.0451×0.9081 = 4.3322, which is about 19% lower than the pure border
effect mentioned above.
Trade flows between regions within the same country are also affected by the removal of the
border, and the bilateral border effects can be decomposed for these cases as well. Consider,
for example, exports from BC to Ontario (ON). There is of course no pure border effect for
this intranational trade flow, but due to the endogenous changes in wages and cutoffs we find
a bilateral border effect equal to 1× 1.2324× 1.0451× 0.4683 = 0.6032. The border removal
thus reduces the value of exports from BC to ON by about 40%. This sizeable reduction is
entirely attributable to tougher selection in ON, despite the fact that the wage in ON rises
relative to that in BC.
The right half of Table 3 provides the Brs for exports from New York (NY) to all possible
destinations. As one can see, exports from NY to Que´bec (QC) would rise by a factor of
5.3704 × 1.2894 × 1.0013 × 0.6139 = 4.2565. Although the bilateral border effect from NY
to QC is roughly similar to the one from BC to WA, their decomposition is quite different.
Whereas the selection effect reduces exports significantly in the former case, it is the relative
wage effect that mainly does so in the latter case. Last, exports from NY to California (CA)
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change little after the border removal (1×0.9851×1.0013×0.9920 = 0.9785). The explanation
is that CA is large and far away from the border, so that little additional selection is induced
there, while the wage in NY rises only slightly when compared to that in CA, both in relative
and absolute terms.
To sum up, our findings suggest that any computation of border effects needs to take into
account changes in wages and firm selection in order to yield accurate results. Neglecting these
endogenous adjustments leads to biased predictions for changes in inter- and intra-national
trade flows in a borderless world.
5.2 The impacts of removing the border on key economic aggre-
gates
Moving our focus away from the effects on trade flows, we now investigate the predictions of
our model on how trade integration affects other key economic aggregates.
5.2.1 Wages and productivity
Column 1 in Table 4 shows that the border removal favors wage convergence, as wages in
Canadian provinces rise relative to those in U.S. states.19 For our benchmark specification,
wages in Canadian provinces rise by between 4.51% in British Columbia and 12.27% in Man-
itoba. It is worth pointing out that wages rise more in less populated regions like Manitoba,
Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island and Saskatchewan. Turning to U.S. states, the wage
changes are much smaller and can go either way. Less populated regions closer to the border
benefit the most, with wage gains of about 1.43-2.02% in Maine, Montana, North Dakota
and Vermont. The most remote states like California, Florida, Louisiana and Texas may even
experience a slight decrease in their relative wages.
Insert Table 4 about here.
As for changes in cutoffs, one can see from column 2 of Table 4 that they are negative
for all regions. This shows that removing the border induces tougher selection and increases
average productivity everywhere. The productivity gains are larger in Canada, which can be
explained by the fact that it is the smaller economy, so that there is less selection than in the
U.S. prior to the border removal. Columns 1 and 2 also reveal that productivity gains always
exceed wage gains. Hence, our counterfactual analysis suggests that the border removal yields
cost reductions ranging from 3.86% to 9.08% in Canada, and from 0.36% to 2.06% in the U.S.
19All wages are expressed in terms of that in Alabama, which we set to one by choice of numeraire. Doing
so entails no loss of generality.
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The role of endogenous wages is crucial for explaining the difference of our results with
those of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). The border removal raises productivity and thus
expected profits everywhere, but relatively more in Canada than in the U.S. Consequently, the
relative wages should rise in Canada and fall in the U.S. In a fixed-wage model, the measured
Canadian border effect would be overstated, because the export dampening effects of the
higher relative wage would not be taken into account. The measured U.S. border effect would
be understated for analogous reasons. This may explain why Anderson and van Wincoop
(2003), who do not consider endogenous wages, find highly dissimilar border effects for the
Canada and the U.S. (10.5 and 2.56, respectively). By contrast, the gap is much smaller in
our model (7.15 in Canada and 4.03 in the U.S.) due to endogenous wages and selection.
5.2.2 Markups, exporters, and varieties produced and consumed
Next, we quantify the pro-competitive effects of trade integration. Column 3 of Table 4
shows that average markups fall in all regions, yet not uniformely. There is a reduction
by 3.90% to 9.14% in Canada, whereas the corresponding figures for the U.S. range from
0.37% to 2.07%. These pro-competitive effects are driven by the fact that removing the
border substantially increases, in every region, the share of firms engaged in cross-border
transactions. Initially, 1.24% of U.S. firms export, whereas the corresponding figure for Canada
is 5.14% (Column 4). After completely removing the border these figures increase to 2.13%
for the U.S. and 13.6% for the Canada (Column 5). This increase in the share of exporters
raises consumption diversity everywhere, with values ranging from 0.17-4.17% in the U.S to
8.76-23.6% in Canada (Column 6). Hence, more firms compete in each market, which puts
downward pressure on markups.
Last, Column 7 shows that there is a reduction in production diversity everywhere due
to firm selection. This effect is more pronounced in Canada than in the U.S.20 Even though
the magnitudes predicted by our model are too large, they are qualitatively in line with Head
and Ries (1999), who report that in the first six years after the Canada-U.S. FTA the number
of Canadian plants decreased by about 21%. Exit of firms also occurs in the U.S., but on a
smaller scale as the U.S. market is already more competitive and has tougher selection. States
close to the border (e.g., Maine, Montana, North Dakota and Vermont) are on average more
affected as they are more strongly exposed to competition from Canadian firms.
20Consumption diversity expands even when the mass of local firms decreases in all regions. The reason is
that less domestic firms are more than compensated for by additional foreign firms. One can indeed check
that removing the border decreases all the domestic cutoffs, thus reducing domestic consumption diversity.
However, all export cutoffs increase, thereby raising import consumption diversity.
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5.2.3 Welfare
Finally, we can quantify the impact of trade integration on welfare. This can be done as
follows. Since e−αqsr(m) = psr(m)/p
d
r by (13), the indirect utility in region r is given by
Ur =
∑
s
NEs
∫ mxsr
0
[
1− e−αqsr(m)
]
dGs(m) = N
c
r
(
1−
pr
pdr
)
.
Using expression (16), one can verify that pr = [k/(k + 1)]p
d
r + αwr/N
c
r , which allows us to
express the indirect utility as Ur = N
c
r/(k + 1)−α/(τrrm
d
r). Since N
c
r is defined as in (19), and
making use of the fact that expression (26) holds in equilibrium, we can rewrite the indirect
utility as:
Ur =
[
1
(k + 1)κ3
− 1
]
α
τrrmdr
.
Hence, welfare is inversely proportional to the cutoff mdr .
21 Column 8 of Table 4 provides the
changes in welfare due to the border removal. As expected, removing the border would yield
welfare gains in all provinces and states. However, Canadian provinces would benefit more. In
particular, welfare would rise by approximately 10% in Canada and by roughly 3% in the U.S.
The reason for this asymmetry is that consumption diversity expands more strongly, cutoffs
fall by a larger margin, and markups decrease more substantially in Canada than in the U.S.
5.3 The impacts of population changes on key economic aggregates
The counterfactual analysis of the border removal is just one of the possible applications of
our model. We now propose a second one which quantifies the potential impacts of regional
changes in factor endowments. How do regional population changes affect the key economic
aggregates? To answer this question, we proceed as follows. First, we estimate the gravity
equation system for our benchmark case. Second, holding the shape parameter k as well as
the estimated upper bounds µ̂maxr and trade frictions (γ̂, θ̂) constant, we solve (32) and (33) by
replacing the 1993 regional population sizes with those of 2007. This yields the wages w˜r and
the cutoffs m˜ds that would prevail in a hypothetical world where trade frictions are unchanged
with respect to 1993 and in which only population would have changed. Table 5 summarizes
our main results.
Insert Table 5 about here.
Note first from column 1 that regions and provinces experienced substantially different
patterns of population change between 1993 and 2007. Whereas most regions grew in absolute
21Alternatively, the equilibrium utility can be written as Ur = [1/(k+ 1)− κ3]N
c
r ., i.e., it is proportional to
the mass of varieties consumed.
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terms (Newfoundland, Saskatchewan and West Virginia being the exceptions) the relative
growth rates vastly differ across regions. As is well known, the western provinces (Alberta,
British Columbia), and the southern states (Nevada, Arizona, California, Florida, Texas,
Georgia) experienced the largest relative growth. As can be seen from column 2 of Table 5,
those provinces and states naturally experience the largest cutoff falls and wage gains. Most
other regions experience a decline in their relative wage, yet still enjoy lower cutoffs because
of tougher selection driven by population growth in the different regions. The only exception
is Newfoundland, which experiences a strong decline in its relative wage and a 0.5% decline
in its average productivity due to its loss of population.
Note, finally, that welfare changes again mirror the changes in cutoffs and the mass of
varieties consumed as shown in Section 5.2.3. Two differences with respect to the border
removal counterfactual are worth noting. First, the U.S. states gain on average more than the
Canadian provinces because of more sustained increases in regional populations. Second, not
all regions gain, as shown by the welfare losses in Newfoundland. This small peripheral region
is hurt by its population exodous, its decreasing share of exporters, its lower wages and its
worsening average productivity.
6 Conclusions
We have developed a new general equilibrium model of trade with heterogeneous firms and
variable demand elasticities in which both wages and productivity respond to trade liberal-
ization and population changes. Trade integration, or a larger local population, intensifies
competition and forces the least efficient firms to leave the market, thereby affecting aggre-
gate productivity and factor prices. Our framework, which takes into account the endogenous
responses of productivity and wages to changes in the economic environment, is therefore well
suited to the analysis of various counterfactuals.
First, we have decomposed the impacts of a full border removal between Canada and the
U.S. on trade flows into: (i) a pure border effect; (ii) relative and absolute wage effects; and (iii)
a selection effect. We find that ignoring endogenous wages and selection effects systematically
biases border effects: Canadian border effects are in fact overestimated, while U.S. border
effects are underestimated. Our counterfactual analysis indicates that such a bias is largely
due to fixed wages. Indeed, allowing for flexible wages, we show that trade integration induces
wage convergence between the two countries, thus narrowing the gap in the border effects
between Canada and the U.S. Although there is substantial regional heterogeneity, our results
further suggest that aggregate productivity, the share of exporters and the mass of varieties
consumed rise everywhere, whereas average markups and the mass of varieties produced fall in
all regions. These changes, which largely arise because of selection effects induced by a more
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competitive environment, map into welfare gains for all U.S. states and, to a larger extent, for
all Canadian provinces.
Second, we have investigated how regional population changes between 1993 and 2007 affect
wages and average productivity holding trade frictions fixed. The key insight is that differential
population growth would mostly benefit the fastest growing regions in western Canada and the
southern U.S., whereas small peripheral regions like Newfoundland experience falling wages,
a deterioration of their productivity and, ultimately, welfare losses.
As shown in this paper, our model is tractable enough to allow for various extensions. A
first one could be to endogenize population changes through interregional and international
migration, which would nicely fit with our focus on North America. Doing so would, as a by-
product, partly bridge the gap between trade models with heterogeneous firms and the ‘new’
economic geography literature. A second extension could be an application to the international
context where factor prices vastly differ across countries. Given the absence of FPE in our
model, it should be especially suited to this exercise. We keep these avenues open for future
research.
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Appendix A: Proofs and computations
A.1. Derivation of (8). Using pd = mdw, the first-order conditions (6) can be rewritten
as
ln
[
mdw
p(m)
]
= 1−
mw
p(m)
.
Taking exponential of both sides and rearranging terms, we have
e
m
md
=
mw
p(m)
e
mw
p(m) .
Noting that the Lambert W function is defined as ϕ = W (ϕ)eW (ϕ) and setting ϕ = em/md,
we obtain W (em/md) = mw/p(m), which implies p(m) as given in (8). The derivations of
q(m) and pi(m) follow straightforwardly.
A.2. Existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium cutoff md. We show that there
exists a unique equilibrium cutoff md. To see this, applying the Leibnitz integral rule to the
left-hand side of (10) and using W (e) = 1 to obtain
eL
α(md)2
∫ md
0
m2
(
W−2 − 1
)
W ′dG(m) > 0,
where the sign comes from W ′ > 0 and W−2 ≥ 1 for 0 ≤ m ≤ md. Hence, the left-hand side
of (10) is strictly increasing. This uniquely determines the equilibrium cutoff md, because
lim
md→0
∫ md
0
m
(
W−1 +W − 2
)
dG(m) = 0 and lim
md→∞
∫ md
0
m
(
W−1 +W − 2
)
dG(m) =∞.
A.3. Market size, the equilibrium cutoff, and the mass of entrants. Differentiating
(10) and using the Leibniz integral rule, we readily obtain
∂md
∂L
= −
αF
(
md
)2
eL2
[∫ md
0
m2
(
W−2 − 1
)
W ′dG(m)
]−1
< 0,
because W ′ > 0 and W−2 ≥ 1 for 0 ≤ m ≤ md. Differentiating (12) with respect to L yields
∂NE
∂L
=
F (NE)2
L2
{
1−
eL3
αF (md)2
[∫ md
0
m2W ′dG(m)
]
∂md
∂L
}
> 0,
where the sign comes from ∂md/∂L < 0 as established in the foregoing.
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A.4. Existence and uniqueness in the two-region case. Under our assumptions
on trade costs, the RHS of (30) is non-negative if and only if ω < ω < ω, where ω ≡
ρ1/(k+1) (τ22/τ12)
k/(k+1) and ω ≡ ρ1/(k+1) (τ21/τ11)
k/(k+1). Furthermore, the RHS is strictly de-
creasing in ω ∈ (ω, ω) with limω→ω+RHS = ∞ and limω→ω−RHS = 0. The LHS of (30) is,
on the contrary, strictly increasing in ω ∈ (0,∞). Hence, there exists a unique equilibrium
ω∗ ∈ (ω, ω).
A.5. Market size, trade frictions, and wages. (i) First, ω∗ is increasing in L1/L2 as an
increase in L1/L2 raises the RHS of (30) without affecting the LHS. This implies that if the two
regions have equal technological possibilities (ρ = 1) and face symmetric trade costs (τ12 = τ21
and τ11 = τ22), the larger region has the higher relative wage. (ii) Since (τ11τ22)
k < (τ12τ21)
k
holds by assumption, the RHS of (30) shifts up as ρ increases, which then also increases ω∗.
This implies that if the two regions are of equal size (L1 = L2) and face symmetric trade costs
(τ12 = τ21 and τ11 = τ22), the region with the better technological possibilities has the higher
wage. (iii) Higher internal trade costs in one region reduce the relative wage of that region,
because
∂(RHS)
∂τ11
< 0 iff ω∗ > ω and
∂(RHS)
∂τ22
> 0 iff ω∗ < ω.
(iv) Better access to the foreign market raises the domestic relative wage, whereas better
access to the domestic market reduces the domestic relative wage because
∂(RHS)
∂τ12
< 0 iff ω∗ < ω and
∂(RHS)
∂τ21
> 0 iff ω∗ > ω.
(v) Assuming that τ12 = τ21 = τ and that τ11 = τ22 = t, one can verify that
∂(RHS)
∂τ
= −
kρtk
τk+1
L1
L2
ρ2 − ω2(k+1)
[ωk+1 − ρ(t/τ)k]2

>
=
<
 0 for

ω < ρ
1
k+1 < ω∗ < ω
ω < ω∗ = ρ
1
k+1 < ω
ω < ω∗ < ρ
1
k+1 < ω
 . (36)
Note that when regions are of equal size, but have different upper bounds (ρ > 1), the first
case of (36) applies since ω∗ > ρ1/(k+1) in equilibrium. To see this, evaluate (30) at ω = ρ1/(k+1)
and recall that τ21 = τ12 = τ and L1 = L2. The LHS is equal to ρ
k/(k+1), which falls short
of the RHS given by ρ (since ρ > 1 and k ≥ 1). Since the LHS is increasing and the RHS is
decreasing, it must be that ω∗ > ρ1/(k+1). Hence, lower trade costs reduce the relative wage
of the more productive region. Furthermore, when regions have the same upper bounds but
different sizes (L1 > L2), we obtain ω
∗ > ρk/(k+1) = 1, so that the first case of (36) applies
again.
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Appendix B: Integrals involving the Lambert W function
To derive closed-form solutions for various expressions throughout the paper we need to com-
pute integrals involving the Lambert W function. This can be done by using the change in
variables suggested by Corless et al. (1996, p.341). Let
z ≡W
(
e
m
I
)
, so that e
m
I
= zez, where I = mdr , m
x
rs,
where subscript r can be dropped in the closed economy. The change in variables then yields
dm = (1+z)ez−1Idz, with the new integration bounds given by 0 and 1. Under our assumption
of a Pareto distribution for productivity draws, the change in variables allows to rewrite
integrals in simplified form.
B.1. First, consider the following expression, which appear when integrating firms’ outputs:∫ I
0
m
[
1−W
(
e
m
I
)]
dGr(m) = κ1 (m
max
r )
−k Ik+1,
where κ1 ≡ ke
−(k+1)
∫ 1
0
(1− z2) (zez)k ezdz > 0 is a constant term which solely depends on the
shape parameter k.
B.2. Second, the following expression appears when integrating firms’ operating profits:∫ I
0
m
[
W
(
e
m
I
)−1
+W
(
e
m
I
)
− 2
]
dGr(m) = κ2 (m
max
r )
−k Ik+1,
where κ2 ≡ ke
−(k+1)
∫ 1
0
(1+z) (z−1 + z − 2) (zez)k ezdz > 0 is also a constant term which solely
depends on the shape parameter k.
B.3. Finally, the following expression appears when integrating firms’ revenues:∫ I
0
m
[
W
(
e
m
I
)−1
− 1
]
dGr(m) = κ3 (m
max
r )
−k Ik+1,
where κ3 ≡ ke
−(1+k)
∫ 1
0
(z−1 − z) (zez)k ezdz > 0 is a constant term which solely depends on
the shape parameter k. Using the expressions for κ1 and κ2, one can verify that κ3 = κ1+ κ2.
Appendix C: Equilibrium in the open economy
In this appendix we restate the equilibrium conditions using the Lambert W function.
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C.1. Using (18), the labor market clearing condition can be rewritten as follows:
NEr
{
1
α
∑
s
Lsτrs
∫ mxrs
0
m
[
1−W
(
e
m
mxrs
)]
dGr(m) + Fr
}
= Lr. (37)
C.2. Plugging (18) into (20), zero expected profits require that
1
α
∑
s
Lsτrs
∫ mxrs
0
m
[
W
(
e
m
mxrs
)−1
+W
(
e
m
mxrs
)
− 2
]
dGr(m) = Fr. (38)
As in the closed economy case, the zero expected profit condition depends solely on the cutoffs
mxrs and is independent of the mass of entrants.
C.3. Finally, trade balance condition is given by
NEr wr
∑
s 6=r
Lsτrs
∫ mxrs
0
m
[
W
(
e
m
mxrs
)−1
− 1
]
dGr(m)
= Lr
∑
s 6=r
NEs τsrws
∫ mxsr
0
m
[
W
(
e
m
mxsr
)−1
− 1
]
dGs(m). (39)
Applying the region-specific Pareto distributions Gr(m) = (m/m
max
r )
k to (37)–(39) yields
after some algebra expressions (22)–(24) given in the main text.
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Table 1: Estimations of the gravity equation system
Benchmark(1) Robustness(2) Robustness(3) Robustness(4) Robustness(5) Robustness(6)
Regions 61 (40) 61 (40) 61 (40) 61 (40) 61 (40) 61 (40)
Flows 1560 1560 1560 1560 1600 1511
k 3.6 1.4 6.5 3.6 3.6 3.6
Internal dist. AvW AvW AvW RV AvW AvW
Coefficients:
constant −4.4403 −3.9970 −4.4655 −4.2331 −4.4228 −4.4217
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
lndrs −1.2287 −1.4766 −1.2006 −1.5222 −1.2380 −1.2233
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
lndrr 1.5700 2.5312 1.3853 1.9450 1.5819 1.5630
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
brs −1.6809 −1.5378 −1.6812 −1.6504 −1.6795 −1.7682
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
0− dummy −17.772 −17.813 −17.748 −17.569 −17.775 —
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) —
Adjusted R2 0.8911 0.8861 0.8916 0.9060 0.8957 0.6094
Notes: p-values in parentheses. Benchmark(1) uses 1560 trade flows (excluding Xrr as in Anderson and van Wincoop,
2003). AvW refers to Anderson and van Wincoop’s (2003) measure of internal distance while RV refers to Redding and
Venables’ (2004) measure. The convergence criterion for the iterative procedure is based on the norm of the vector of
regression coefficients between two successive iterations, with threshold 10−12. Starting points for the iterative solver
are obtained via OLS with importer-exporter fixed effects. We choose wAlabama = 1 as numeraire and set starting
wages to wr = 1 for all r. Results are invariant to that choice.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for bilateral border effects
Descriptive statistics for bilateral border effect series:
Benchmark(1) Robustness(2) Robustness(3) Robustness(4) Robustness(5) Robustness(6)
Minimum 0.4241 0.5837 0.3903 0.3255 0.4285 0.4142
Maximum 4.5036 4.2804 4.3914 4.6622 4.5107 4.8886
Mean 1.7284 1.7480 1.6847 1.7142 1.7323 1.8117
Std. dev. 1.3042 1.2867 1.2433 1.2908 1.3094 1.4440
Median 0.9650 0.9824 0.9629 0.9746 0.9654 0.9638
Skewness 1.0636 1.0413 1.0769 1.1623 1.0629 1.0656
Kurtosis 2.2443 2.1429 2.3035 2.5842 2.2404 2.2459
Correlation matrix for bilateral border effect series:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(1) 1 0.9978 0.9960 0.9708 0.9979 0.9979
(2) 1 0.9997 0.9595 0.9999 0.9999
(3) 1 0.9545 0.9997 0.9997
(4) 1 0.9599 0.9593
(5) 1 0.9999
(6) 1
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Table 3: Bilateral border effects decomposition for the province of British Columbia
and the state of New York
Benchmark(1)
Exporter: British Columbia Exporter: New York
Pure border Rel. wage Abs. wage Selection Bil. border Pure border Rel. wage Abs. wage Selection Bil. border
e
bθbrs ∆(ws/wr) ∆wr ∆m
d
s Brs e
bθbrs ∆(ws/wr) ∆wr ∆m
d
s Brs
Importer: In Gravity sample
Alberta 1.0000 1.1415 1.0451 0.5368 0.6404 5.3704 1.3902 1.0013 0.5368 4.0129
British Columbia 1.0000 1.0000 1.0451 0.6796 0.7103 5.3704 1.2179 1.0013 0.6796 4.4509
Manitoba 1.0000 1.3902 1.0451 0.3778 0.5489 5.3704 1.6931 1.0013 0.3778 3.4394
New Brunswick 1.0000 1.2588 1.0451 0.4509 0.5932 5.3704 1.5331 1.0013 0.4509 3.7172
Newfoundland 1.0000 1.3673 1.0451 0.3892 0.5561 5.3704 1.6651 1.0013 0.3892 3.4845
Nova Scotia 1.0000 1.0793 1.0451 0.5932 0.6692 5.3704 1.3144 1.0013 0.5932 4.1930
Ontario 1.0000 1.2324 1.0451 0.4683 0.6032 5.3704 1.5009 1.0013 0.4683 3.7795
Prince Edw. Isl. 1.0000 1.2753 1.0451 0.4406 0.5872 5.3704 1.5532 1.0013 0.4406 3.6795
Quebec 1.0000 1.0587 1.0451 0.6139 0.6793 5.3704 1.2894 1.0013 0.6139 4.2565
Saskatchewan 1.0000 1.3150 1.0451 0.4171 0.5733 5.3704 1.6015 1.0013 0.4171 3.5924
Alabama 5.3704 0.8162 1.0451 0.9761 4.4717 1.0000 0.9941 1.0013 0.9761 0.9715
Arizona 5.3704 0.8256 1.0451 0.9565 4.4321 1.0000 1.0054 1.0013 0.9565 0.9629
California 5.3704 0.8089 1.0451 0.9920 4.5036 1.0000 0.9851 1.0013 0.9920 0.9785
Florida 5.3704 0.8133 1.0451 0.9824 4.4844 1.0000 0.9905 1.0013 0.9824 0.9743
Georgia 5.3704 0.8156 1.0451 0.9773 4.4742 1.0000 0.9934 1.0013 0.9773 0.9721
Idaho 5.3704 0.8543 1.0451 0.9000 4.3151 1.0000 1.0404 1.0013 0.9000 0.9375
Illinois 5.3704 0.8169 1.0451 0.9747 4.4690 1.0000 0.9948 1.0013 0.9747 0.9710
Indiana 5.3704 0.8222 1.0451 0.9636 4.4465 1.0000 1.0013 1.0013 0.9636 0.9661
Kentucky 5.3704 0.8223 1.0451 0.9633 4.4459 1.0000 1.0014 1.0013 0.9633 0.9659
Louisiana 5.3704 0.8143 1.0451 0.9802 4.4801 1.0000 0.9917 1.0013 0.9802 0.9734
Maine 5.3704 0.8948 1.0451 0.8286 4.1614 1.0000 1.0897 1.0013 0.8286 0.9041
Maryland 5.3704 0.8126 1.0451 0.9838 4.4872 1.0000 0.9897 1.0013 0.9838 0.9749
Massachusetts 5.3704 0.8181 1.0451 0.9720 4.4636 1.0000 0.9964 1.0013 0.9720 0.9698
Michigan 5.3704 0.8406 1.0451 0.9263 4.3701 1.0000 1.0237 1.0013 0.9263 0.9495
Minnesota 5.3704 0.8355 1.0451 0.9362 4.3906 1.0000 1.0176 1.0013 0.9362 0.9539
Missouri 5.3704 0.8190 1.0451 0.9703 4.4601 1.0000 0.9974 1.0013 0.9703 0.9690
Montana 5.3704 0.8813 1.0451 0.8514 4.2114 1.0000 1.0733 1.0013 0.8514 0.9150
New Hampshire 5.3704 0.8467 1.0451 0.9144 4.3454 1.0000 1.0311 1.0013 0.9144 0.9441
New Jersey 5.3704 0.8206 1.0451 0.9669 4.4531 1.0000 0.9994 1.0013 0.9669 0.9675
New York 5.3704 0.8211 1.0451 0.9658 4.4509 1.0000 1.0000 1.0013 0.9658 0.9670
North Carolina 5.3704 0.8199 1.0451 0.9683 4.4561 1.0000 0.9985 1.0013 0.9683 0.9681
North Dakota 5.3704 0.8715 1.0451 0.8685 4.2482 1.0000 1.0614 1.0013 0.8685 0.9230
Ohio 5.3704 0.8250 1.0451 0.9576 4.4344 1.0000 1.0048 1.0013 0.9576 0.9634
Pennsylvania 5.3704 0.8236 1.0451 0.9607 4.4406 1.0000 1.0030 1.0013 0.9607 0.9648
Tennessee 5.3704 0.8202 1.0451 0.9677 4.4548 1.0000 0.9989 1.0013 0.9677 0.9679
Texas 5.3704 0.8148 1.0451 0.9792 4.4780 1.0000 0.9923 1.0013 0.9792 0.9729
Vermont 5.3704 0.8852 1.0451 0.8446 4.1965 1.0000 1.0781 1.0013 0.8446 0.9117
Virginia 5.3704 0.8194 1.0451 0.9694 4.4583 1.0000 0.9979 1.0013 0.9694 0.9686
Washington 5.3704 0.8500 1.0451 0.9081 4.3322 1.0000 1.0352 1.0013 0.9081 0.9412
Wisconsin 5.3704 0.8325 1.0451 0.9423 4.4031 1.0000 1.0139 1.0013 0.9423 0.9566
Importer: Out of Gravity sample
Alaska 5.3704 0.8327 1.0451 0.9420 4.4025 1.0000 1.0141 1.0013 0.9420 0.9565
Arkansas 5.3704 0.8220 1.0451 0.9640 4.4473 1.0000 1.0010 1.0013 0.9640 0.9662
Colorado 5.3704 0.8166 1.0451 0.9753 4.4702 1.0000 0.9945 1.0013 0.9753 0.9712
Connecticut 5.3704 0.8250 1.0451 0.9577 4.4347 1.0000 1.0047 1.0013 0.9577 0.9635
Delaware 5.3704 0.8262 1.0451 0.9551 4.4293 1.0000 1.0062 1.0013 0.9551 0.9623
Dist. of Columbia 5.3704 0.8198 1.0451 0.9684 4.4563 1.0000 0.9985 1.0013 0.9684 0.9682
Hawaii 5.3704 0.8487 1.0451 0.9105 4.3372 1.0000 1.0336 1.0013 0.9105 0.9423
Iowa 5.3704 0.8260 1.0451 0.9556 4.4303 1.0000 1.0060 1.0013 0.9556 0.9625
Kansas 5.3704 0.8207 1.0451 0.9667 4.4528 1.0000 0.9995 1.0013 0.9667 0.9674
Mississippi 5.3704 0.8174 1.0451 0.9736 4.4666 1.0000 0.9955 1.0013 0.9736 0.9704
Nebraska 5.3704 0.8256 1.0451 0.9564 4.4319 1.0000 1.0055 1.0013 0.9564 0.9629
Nevada 5.3704 0.8187 1.0451 0.9708 4.4612 1.0000 0.9971 1.0013 0.9708 0.9692
New Mexico 5.3704 0.8282 1.0451 0.9512 4.4213 1.0000 1.0086 1.0013 0.9512 0.9606
Oklahoma 5.3704 0.8231 1.0451 0.9617 4.4427 1.0000 1.0024 1.0013 0.9617 0.9652
Oregon 5.3704 0.8372 1.0451 0.9330 4.3840 1.0000 1.0196 1.0013 0.9330 0.9525
Rhode Island 5.3704 0.8284 1.0451 0.9506 4.4202 1.0000 1.0089 1.0013 0.9506 0.9603
South Carolina 5.3704 0.8228 1.0451 0.9622 4.4438 1.0000 1.0021 1.0013 0.9622 0.9655
South Dakota 5.3704 0.8481 1.0451 0.9117 4.3397 1.0000 1.0329 1.0013 0.9117 0.9429
Utah 5.3704 0.8388 1.0451 0.9297 4.3772 1.0000 1.0216 1.0013 0.9297 0.9510
West Virginia 5.3704 0.8322 1.0451 0.9429 4.4044 1.0000 1.0135 1.0013 0.9429 0.9569
Wyoming 5.3704 0.8280 1.0451 0.9516 4.4221 1.0000 1.0083 1.0013 0.9516 0.9608
Notes: Border effects are decomposed as indicated by (35).
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Table 4: Impacts of fully removing the border, holding all other parameters fixed
Benchmark (1)
Wage Cutoff Markup Initial % of Final % of Consumed Produced Welfare
∆(wr)% ∆(m
d
r)% ∆(αEr/N
c
r )% exporters exporters ∆(N
c
r )% ∆(N
p
r )% ∆U
∗
r%
State/province In Gravity sample
Alberta 7.5642 -12.6501 -6.0428 2.3633 14.9207 14.4821 -38.5468 14.4821
British Columbia 4.5131 -8.0525 -3.9028 3.0069 17.8384 8.7577 -26.0831 8.7577
Manitoba 12.2724 -19.0725 -9.1407 2.5842 18.4735 23.5673 -53.3183 23.5673
New Brunswick 9.8759 -15.8991 -7.5934 1.9725 13.0564 18.9048 -46.3855 18.9048
Newfoundland 11.8673 -18.5492 -8.8832 0.6401 4.4570 22.7735 -52.2225 22.7735
Nova Scotia 6.2608 -10.7310 -5.1420 0.6954 4.1891 12.0209 -33.5457 12.0209
Ontario 9.3696 -15.2038 -7.2588 3.0667 20.1687 17.9299 -44.7726 17.9299
Prince Edward Isl. 10.1873 -16.3224 -7.7978 0.3870 2.5819 19.5063 -47.3506 19.5063
Quebec 5.8181 -10.0642 -4.8316 4.2744 25.4465 11.1904 -31.7413 11.1904
Saskatchewan 10.9235 -17.3097 -8.2771 2.2684 15.6725 20.9332 -49.5529 20.9332
Alabama 0.0000 -0.5251 -0.5251 0.5974 2.4410 0.5278 -1.8773 0.5278
Arizona 0.2474 -0.9623 -0.7172 1.3872 5.6017 0.9716 -3.4210 0.9716
California -0.1973 -0.1742 -0.3712 0.7466 3.2289 0.1745 -0.6257 0.1745
Florida -0.0789 -0.3849 -0.4636 0.8554 3.4874 0.3864 -1.3788 0.3864
Georgia -0.0156 -0.4974 -0.5129 0.6965 2.8449 0.4998 -1.7789 0.4998
Idaho 0.9951 -2.2655 -1.2929 1.6960 7.4970 2.3180 -7.9185 2.3180
Illinois 0.0168 -0.5548 -0.5381 1.3945 5.4074 0.5579 -1.9830 0.5579
Indiana 0.1571 -0.8031 -0.6472 1.0195 4.2731 0.8096 -2.8609 0.8096
Kentucky 0.1607 -0.8093 -0.6500 0.8182 3.4295 0.8160 -2.8831 0.8160
Louisiana -0.0518 -0.4332 -0.4847 0.4159 1.6522 0.4350 -1.5506 0.4350
Maine 2.0177 -4.0051 -2.0681 2.8319 12.3393 4.1722 -13.6835 4.1722
Maryland -0.0957 -0.3551 -0.4505 0.2358 0.9813 0.3564 -1.2726 0.3564
Massachusetts 0.0506 -0.6147 -0.5644 0.6961 2.8713 0.6185 -2.1954 0.6185
Michigan 0.6404 -1.6507 -1.0208 3.0560 12.9833 1.6784 -5.8161 1.6784
Minnesota 0.5095 -1.4222 -0.9199 3.5620 14.0049 1.4427 -5.0259 1.4427
Missouri 0.0725 -0.6535 -0.5815 1.1937 4.6360 0.6578 -2.3328 0.6578
Montana 1.6802 -3.4363 -1.8138 2.8597 12.0188 3.5586 -11.8282 3.5586
New Hampshire 0.7991 -1.9265 -1.1428 0.9073 3.8217 1.9644 -6.7635 1.9644
New Jersey 0.1158 -0.7300 -0.6151 0.8510 3.4884 0.7354 -2.6033 0.7354
New York 0.1295 -0.7542 -0.6257 1.4457 5.9290 0.7599 -2.6886 0.7599
North Carolina 0.0975 -0.6977 -0.6009 0.9245 3.7881 0.7026 -2.4889 0.7026
North Dakota 1.4348 -3.0194 -1.6279 2.4809 10.2899 3.1134 -10.4499 3.1134
Ohio 0.2331 -0.9371 -0.7062 1.7841 7.4937 0.9460 -3.3327 0.9460
Pennsylvania 0.1944 -0.8688 -0.6761 1.4866 6.2371 0.8764 -3.0924 0.8764
Tennessee 0.1056 -0.7120 -0.6072 0.9501 3.6932 0.7171 -2.5395 0.7171
Texas -0.0387 -0.4564 -0.4949 1.6317 6.5363 0.4584 -1.6332 0.4584
Vermont 1.7802 -3.6052 -1.8893 1.0820 5.2072 3.7401 -12.3822 3.7401
Virginia 0.0838 -0.6735 -0.5902 0.7297 2.9887 0.6780 -2.4033 0.6780
Washington 0.8846 -2.0746 -1.2083 3.8231 18.5861 2.1186 -7.2694 2.1186
Wisconsin 0.4306 -1.2841 -0.8590 2.5627 10.0535 1.3009 -4.5463 1.3009
State/province Out of Gravity sample
Alaska 0.4346 -1.2910 -0.8621 0.2520 1.1155 1.3079 -4.5702 1.3079
Arkansas 0.1521 -0.7942 -0.6433 0.9901 3.8538 0.8005 -2.8296 0.8005
Colorado 0.0097 -0.5422 -0.5326 0.6254 2.5086 0.5452 -1.9384 0.5452
Connecticut 0.2314 -0.9341 -0.7049 0.7055 2.9016 0.9430 -3.3223 0.9430
Delaware 0.2651 -0.9934 -0.7310 0.2843 1.1704 1.0034 -3.5304 1.0034
Hawaii 0.8519 -2.0180 -1.1833 1.1719 5.2488 2.0595 -7.0762 2.0595
Iowa 0.2589 -0.9825 -0.7262 1.5910 6.2115 0.9923 -3.4922 0.9923
Kansas 0.1181 -0.7342 -0.6169 0.8324 3.2369 0.7396 -2.6179 0.7396
Mississippi 0.0316 -0.5810 -0.5496 0.5127 1.9889 0.5844 -2.0759 0.5844
Nebraska 0.2485 -0.9642 -0.7181 0.9387 3.6637 0.9736 -3.4279 0.9736
Nevada 0.0657 -0.6414 -0.5762 0.3591 1.5296 0.6456 -2.2900 0.6456
New Mexico 0.3157 -1.0824 -0.7701 1.0928 4.4214 1.0942 -3.8421 1.0942
Oklahoma 0.1810 -0.8453 -0.6658 1.3490 5.4372 0.8525 -3.0098 0.8525
Oregon 0.5519 -1.4962 -0.9526 1.6925 8.1520 1.5190 -5.2825 1.5190
Rhode Island 0.3225 -1.0944 -0.7754 0.4307 1.7760 1.1065 -3.8842 1.1065
South Carolina 0.1742 -0.8332 -0.6605 0.9215 3.7837 0.8402 -2.9672 0.8402
South Dakota 0.8358 -1.9901 -1.1709 1.4998 6.0644 2.0305 -6.9809 2.0305
Utah 0.5953 -1.5721 -0.9861 1.8548 7.5632 1.5972 -5.5447 1.5972
West Virginia 0.4225 -1.2699 -0.8527 1.0094 4.2621 1.2862 -4.4965 1.2862
Wyoming 0.3106 -1.0735 -0.7662 0.3791 1.5335 1.0851 -3.8109 1.0851
Washington DC 0.0961 -0.6952 -0.5998 0.1239 0.5184 0.7001 -2.4802 0.7001
Notes: See Section 5 for details on computations.
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Table 5: Impacts of population changes (1993–2007), holding the trade frictions fixed
Benchmark (1)
% Pop. change Wage Cutoff Markup Initial % of Final % of Consumed Produced Welfare
1993-2007 ∆(wr)% ∆(m
d
r)% ∆(αEr/N
c
r )% exporters exporters ∆(N
c
r )% ∆(N
p
r )% ∆U
∗
r%
State/province In Gravity sample
Alberta 30.2362 0.9476 -4.9646 -4.0641 2.3633 2.4055 5.2240 -16.7494 5.2240
British Columbia 22.7855 0.5764 -4.3385 -3.7871 3.0069 3.0025 4.5352 -14.7579 4.5352
Manitoba 6.1790 -0.8462 -1.8781 -2.7085 2.5842 2.5604 1.9141 -6.5978 1.9141
New Brunswick 0.1295 -1.3864 -0.9179 -2.2916 1.9725 1.9398 0.9265 -3.2654 0.9265
Newfoundland -12.7020 -2.1698 0.5009 -1.6798 0.6401 0.6155 -0.4984 1.8150 -0.4984
Nova Scotia 1.0950 -1.5391 -0.6438 -2.1731 0.6954 0.6809 0.6480 -2.2985 0.6480
Ontario 19.7922 0.1099 -3.5424 -3.4364 3.0667 3.1410 3.6725 -12.1765 3.6725
Prince Edward Island 4.9076 -1.2261 -1.2045 -2.4158 0.3870 0.3823 1.2192 -4.2688 1.2192
Quebec 7.6242 -0.9423 -1.7084 -2.6346 4.2744 4.2570 1.7381 -6.0149 1.7381
Saskatchewan -0.9917 -1.1135 -1.4049 -2.5028 2.2684 2.2304 1.4249 -4.9659 1.4249
Alabama 10.3679 0.0000 -3.3534 -3.3534 0.5974 0.6185 3.4698 -11.5554 3.4698
Arizona 58.7312 2.2688 -7.1422 -5.0355 1.3872 1.5251 7.6916 -23.4147 7.6916
California 17.3563 0.1896 -3.6792 -3.4966 0.7466 0.7746 3.8198 -12.6241 3.8198
Florida 33.0887 1.1578 -5.3165 -4.2202 0.8554 0.9148 5.6150 -17.8538 5.6150
Georgia 38.4483 1.1994 -5.3858 -4.2510 0.6965 0.7458 5.6924 -18.0700 5.6924
Idaho 36.1602 1.0392 -5.1182 -4.1322 1.6960 1.8021 5.3943 -17.2327 5.3943
Illinois 9.6074 -0.5992 -2.3124 -2.8977 1.3945 1.4043 2.3671 -8.0774 2.3671
Indiana 11.2825 -0.5301 -2.4333 -2.9505 1.0195 1.0013 2.4940 -8.4863 2.4940
Kentucky 11.8447 -0.4146 -2.6350 -3.0386 0.8182 0.8062 2.7063 -9.1655 2.7063
Louisiana 0.1973 -0.9823 -1.6377 -2.6039 0.4159 0.4143 1.6650 -5.7713 1.6650
Maine 6.3760 -0.7992 -1.9610 -2.7446 2.8319 2.8797 2.0002 -6.8816 2.0002
Maryland 13.6740 -0.4057 -2.6505 -3.0454 0.2358 0.2351 2.7226 -9.2175 2.7226
Massachusetts 7.3013 -0.9696 -1.6601 -2.6136 0.6961 0.7045 1.6881 -5.8486 1.6881
Michigan 5.6939 -0.8509 -1.8700 -2.7049 3.0560 2.9741 1.9056 -6.5698 1.9056
Minnesota 14.9482 -0.2619 -2.9006 -3.1549 3.5620 3.6215 2.9873 -10.0546 2.9873
Missouri 12.2315 -0.3756 -2.7028 -3.0683 1.1937 1.2097 2.7779 -9.3932 2.7779
Montana 14.0479 0.3160 -3.8954 -3.5917 2.8597 2.9777 4.0533 -13.3280 4.0533
New Hampshire 17.2553 -0.5041 -2.4787 -2.9704 0.9073 0.9304 2.5417 -8.6397 2.5417
New Jersey 10.2989 -0.6804 -2.1699 -2.8356 0.8510 0.8643 2.2181 -7.5939 2.2181
New York 6.3769 -1.0438 -1.5286 -2.5565 1.4457 1.4533 1.5524 -5.3947 1.5524
North Carolina 30.4231 0.7169 -4.5763 -3.8922 0.9245 0.9767 4.7957 -15.5182 4.7957
North Dakota 0.3901 -0.5193 -2.4523 -2.9588 2.4809 2.5070 2.5140 -8.5505 2.5140
Ohio 3.5819 -1.0365 -1.5415 -2.5621 1.7841 1.7272 1.5657 -5.4392 1.5657
Pennsylvania 3.4159 -1.1316 -1.3727 -2.4888 1.4866 1.4352 1.3918 -4.8543 1.3918
Tennessee 21.0602 0.1374 -3.5897 -3.4572 0.9501 0.9769 3.7234 -12.3313 3.7234
Texas 32.8260 1.1298 -5.2697 -4.1994 1.6317 1.7382 5.5628 -17.7075 5.5628
Vermont 8.2316 -0.7367 -2.0710 -2.7925 1.0820 1.0883 2.1148 -7.2572 2.1148
Virginia 19.2937 0.0637 -3.4630 -3.4016 0.7297 0.7569 3.5873 -11.9160 3.5873
Washington 23.2620 0.6285 -4.4268 -3.8261 3.8231 3.8287 4.6318 -15.0407 4.6318
Wisconsin 10.8069 -0.4996 -2.4866 -2.9738 2.5627 2.5880 2.5500 -8.6662 2.5500
State/province Out of Gravity sample
Alaska 14.4868 -0.1346 -3.1210 -3.2515 0.2520 0.2445 3.2216 -10.7874 3.2216
Arkansas 16.9595 -0.0079 -3.3397 -3.3474 0.9901 1.0138 3.4551 -11.5103 3.4551
Colorado 36.5255 1.4534 -5.8077 -4.4387 0.6254 0.6722 6.1658 -19.3777 6.1658
Connecticut 7.0282 -0.9408 -1.7111 -2.6358 0.7055 0.7113 1.7409 -6.0243 1.7409
Delaware 23.6304 -0.1773 -3.0471 -3.2191 0.2843 0.2929 3.1429 -10.5421 3.1429
Hawaii 10.4933 -0.0340 -3.2948 -3.3277 1.1719 1.1883 3.4071 -11.3621 3.4071
Iowa 5.9394 -0.5973 -2.3157 -2.8992 1.5910 1.6023 2.3706 -8.0885 2.3706
Kansas 8.9650 -0.4607 -2.5546 -3.0035 0.8324 0.8415 2.6216 -8.8953 2.6216
Mississippi 10.7457 -0.2911 -2.8499 -3.1327 0.5127 0.5208 2.9335 -9.8852 2.9335
Nebraska 10.0749 -0.3964 -2.6667 -3.0525 0.9387 0.9507 2.7398 -9.2720 2.7398
Nevada 85.8707 2.8851 -8.1314 -5.4809 0.3591 0.4016 8.8511 -26.3111 8.8511
New Mexico 21.9809 0.6845 -4.5215 -3.8680 1.0928 1.1497 4.7357 -15.3437 4.7357
Oklahoma 12.0318 -0.0060 -3.3430 -3.3488 1.3490 1.3920 3.4586 -11.5210 3.4586
Oregon 23.4954 0.6569 -4.4749 -3.8474 1.6925 1.6964 4.6846 -15.1948 4.6846
Rhode Island 6.0109 -0.9553 -1.6855 -2.6246 0.4307 0.4341 1.7143 -5.9359 1.7143
South Carolina 21.2739 0.3432 -3.9419 -3.6122 0.9215 0.9633 4.1037 -13.4789 4.1037
South Dakota 11.1630 -0.2008 -3.0065 -3.2013 1.4998 1.5275 3.0997 -10.4071 3.0997
Utah 41.0096 1.2921 -5.5402 -4.3196 1.8548 1.9847 5.8651 -18.5502 5.8651
West Virginia -0.2282 -0.7210 -2.0987 -2.8046 1.0094 0.9859 2.1437 -7.3515 2.1437
Wyoming 11.4698 0.2163 -3.7250 -3.5167 0.3791 0.3936 3.8691 -12.7734 3.8691
Washington DC 2.0706 -0.9009 -1.7816 -2.6665 0.1239 0.1204 1.8140 -6.2668 1.8140
Notes: See Section 5 for details on computations. Populations in 1993 and in 2007 are taken from Statistics Canada and the U.S. Bureau of Census.
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